The State of Utah v. Paul A. Branch : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Paul A. Branch : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Attorneys for Respondent.
Brooke C. Wells; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Branch, No. 20557.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2033
^ y »£«•*•» J 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DC 
\\ : THE STATE OF UTAH, 
4S.9 2-OSS7 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
PAUL A. BRANCH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 20557 
Category No. 2 
Petition for reconsideration of a decision by the Utah 
Supreme Court, Opinion No. 20557, filed September 17, 1987, in an 
appeal from a conviction and judgment for Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony with firearms enhancement; Aggravated Assault, a 
third degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony and Being a 
Habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge, presiding. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
OCT 91987 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : 
PAUL A. BRANCH, : Case No. 20557 
Defendant-Appellant. : Category No. 2 
Petition for reconsideration of a decision by the Utah 
Supreme Court, Opinion No. 20557, filed September 17, 1987, in an 
appeal from a conviction and judgment for Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony with firearms enhancement; Aggravated Assault, a 
third degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony and Being a 
Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge, presiding. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
INTRODUCTION 2 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT; THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REGARDING EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 3 
CONCLUSION 10 
ii . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. , 90 L.Ed. 69, 
106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) 4 
Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) 2 
Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) 2 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649 
107 S.Ct. (1987) 4, 5, 6 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) 9 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985) 9 
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986) 8 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) 9 
State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) 9 
State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah Adv. 18 (Utah 1987) 3 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1984); 9 
State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981) 9 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) 9 
State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984) 9 
United States Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. . . 5 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section Seven 5, 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : 
PAUL A. BRANCH, : Case No. 20557 
Defendant-Appellant. : Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by 
the Supreme Court on September 17f 1987. Originally, this case was 
an appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony with firearms enhancement; Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony and 
Being a Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the facts set forth in the opinion summarize the 
weakness in the identification evidence in this case, several 
additional facts are of note. When officers searched the Pink Motel 
in Los Angeles, they located a suitcase with tags bearing a female's 
first name and a surname of Miera. Inside that suitcase officers 
found items belonging to Joey Miera, the defendant's half brother 
who closely resembles defendant, and a picture of Mr. Miera (Trial 
Day 6, p. 85-89, 90, 96-98). The proprietor of the pawn shop in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
southern California where some of the jewelry taken from the Oakwood 
robbery was pawned, selected Joey Miera's picture from a photo 
i 
spread (Trial Day 8, p. 43-49). The pawn shop proprietor was unable 
to identify the defendant at trial as the person who pawned the 
items (Trial Day 8, p. 36). 
i 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Pickard, denying I 
rehfg, 11 P.512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be I 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions. . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this 
Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, i 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that 
we have based the decision on some wrong 4 
principle of law, or have either misapplied or 
overlooked something which materially affects 
the result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is ^ 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings v. Nielson, supra at 624. The argument section of this 
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition ^ 
- 2 - d 
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for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. 
In its opinion in State v. Branch, Case No. 20557, (filed September 
17, 1987) (attached as Addendum A) this Court erred in its decision 
regarding the giving of a cautionary eyewitness identification 
instruction, based its decision on an incorrect principle of law and 
otherwise misapplied or overlooked something which would materially 
affect the result in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
This case was on direct appeal to this Court when the 
Court rendered its opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986). Appellant had submitted his opening brief outlining the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony prior to 
issuance of the Long opinion and, by the luck of the draw, was not 
the defendant selected for the preferential treatment awarded 
defendant Long in finding that the Court's failiure to give a 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification was reversible 
error. 
Although this Court has made clear that the standard of 
review for cases tried prior to the decision in State v. Long, 
supra, continues to be whether the judge abused his discretion in 
failing to give a cautionary eyewitness identification rather than 
the heightened standard set forth in Long (See State v. Long, supra, 
State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1987)), Appellant 
Branch respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
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the position on the prospective application of Long, especially in 
the context of the present case. 
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, j 
107 S.Ct. (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. , 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 
S.Ct. 1712 (1986) that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges | 
to exclude blacks from a jury may violate equal protection should be 
applied retroactively. In Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, the Court 
noted that: I 
"failure to apply a newly declared 
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending 
on direct review violates basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication" 
I 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 93 L.Ed.2d at 658. 
The Griffith court acknowledged that "after we have decided a new 
rule in a case selected, the integrity of the judicial review 
I 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on 
direct review . . . (and that) it is the nature of judicial review 
that precludes us from 'simply fishing one case from the stream of 
i 
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new 
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar 
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule1". 
i 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) Id. at 658. 
The Griffith Court also noted that "selective application 
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated 
i 
defendants the same" and that "the problem with not applying new 
rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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results when the court chooses which of many similarly situated 
defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule" 
(citations omitted). Id. at 658-659. 
The Griffith court went on to examine the "clear break" 
exception whereby courts had applied prospectively only rules of 
criminal procedure deemed to be a "clear break" with precedent. The 
Court disapproved such a "clear break" exception and held "that a 
new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review . . . with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a "clear break" with the past". 16^. at 661. 
In addition, the opportunity to consolidate appeals 
exists where similar issues are presented to the Court. Had Mr. 
Branch's appeal been consolidated with that of defendant Long, Mr. 
Branch's case would have been reversed under the rationale set forth 
in Long. Because Mr. Branch was unaware that the Long appeal 
presented a similar issue and would be singled out and because Mr. 
Branch pursued additional issues, the cases were not consolidated 
and the Branch case did not receive the heightened protections set 
forth in Long. 
In State v. Long, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that the failure to give a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction could deny the defendnat due process of 
law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, in the 
present case, the failure to give such an instruction violated Mr. 
Branch's right to due process of law under the Utah Constitution and 
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« 
failure to apply Long retroactively where such a constitutional 
violation occurred violates Mr. Branch's rights to due process and 
equal protection of the law under the United States and Utah I 
Constitutions. (See Griffith v. Kentuckyy supra). Mr. Branch 
respectfully requests that this Court grant this Petition for 
Rehearing and allow both parties the opportunity to brief the issues i 
as to whether his due process rights under the Utah Constitution 
were violated by the failure to give an eyewitness identification 
instruction in this case and whether his rights to due process and i 
equal protection under both Constitutions were violated by this 
Court's failure to apply the decision in State v. Long, supra, to 
his case where his case was on direct appeal at the time the Long i 
decision was issued. 
In the event this Court refuses to review its decision to 
apply the holding regarding cautionary eyewitness identification ^ 
instructions in State v. Long, supra, prospectively and not to cases 
on direct appeal at the time of the decision, Mr. Branch 
nevertheless requests that this Court review its decision that the * 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give the 
requested instruction. 
As this Court noted in the opinion in this case, "there * 
exists a substantial possibility that defendant has been confused in 
this case with his half brother, who closely resembles him." (See 
Addendum A at 5). In addition to the facts outlined in this opinion * 
which support such a possibility, the pawnshop owner in California 
where many of the items involved in this robbery were located, 
selected Mr. Branch's half brother from a photo spread (Trial Day 8, 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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243-49). The pawnshop owner did not identify Mr. Branch in court 
(Trial Day 8, p. 36). A suitcase found by officers at the Pink 
Motel in Los Angeles where the other suspects were arrested bore 
tags with the surname of "Miera" and contained personal effects and 
a picture of Mr. Branch's half brother, Joey Miera (Trial Day 6, p. 
85-89, 90, 96-98). This information coupled with that outlined in 
the opinion and Appellant's Brief suggests a substantial probability 
that Mr. Branch was incorrectly identified in this case. Requiring 
a trial court to instruct a jury as to the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification in circumstances such as this where weak, hesitant, 
conflicting identifications are given and a substantial possibility 
or even likelihood exists that the witnesses have confused the 
defendant with his look-alike half brother is the least this Court 
should do to protect rights to due process and a fair trial of an 
accused. The substantial possibility of misidentification 
acknowledged by this Court should, in and of itself, give rise to a 
finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to 
give such an instruction. 
In its opinion, this Court expresses concern about the 
need to "be cautious in applying the pre-Long case law without 
reference to the later analysis [in Long]yf at 5. Assuming this 
Court does maintain its position that Long be applied prospectively, 
the concerns regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification 
as outlined in Long are nevertheless applicable to cases tried 
before that decision i.e. eyewitness identification was just as 
subject to pitfalls before the Long decision as after. In fact, the 
brief submitted in this case prior to the decision in Long, 
- 7 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
extensively addressed those concerns, citing many of the authorities 
cited in State v, Long. Hence, even if this Court decides to 
continue to apply the Long holding prospectively it nevertheless may I 
consider the pitfalls of eyewitness identification in determining 
whether a trial judge abused his discretion in a given case. As 
this Court noted in Long, "jurors are for the most part, unaware [of I 
the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications." State v. 
Long, supra at 490. This lack of awareness was just as true prior 
to the Long decision and buttresses Mr. Branch's argument that an i 
eyewitness identification instruction was necessary for Mr. Branch 
to receive due process and a fair trial under the circumstances of 
this case. ^ 
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), decided 
shortly after State v. Long, supra, is the only case where this 
Court has found that a trial judge abused his discretion in failing ^ 
to give an eyewitness identification instruction. The facts in this 
case are more closely aligned with Jonas than with cases finding no 
abuse of discretion. None of the witnesses had an adequate * 
opportunity to view the accused, witnesses changed their description 
of the suspect, no physical evidence corroborated the identification 
(although there was physical evidence suggesting that the look alike ' 
half brother was involved) and witnesses gave hesitant and confused 
identifications. The only real difference between the facts in this 
case and those in Jonas is that several rather than just one witness * 
gave unreliable identification testimony. 
This Court focused on that difference and pointed out 
that it has never found an abuse of discretion where more than one 
' - 8 - ' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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eyewitness was involved. However to draw a rigid rule based on the 
number of witnesses who "kind of" identified the defendant does not 
directly address the question of whether in a given case the 
identification evidence raised serious questions about its 
reliability and therefore the trial judge abused his discretion in 
failing to give the requested eyewitness identification 
instruction. A more important focus than the number of witnesses 
would be whether the eyewitnesses had an adequate opportunity to 
view the defendant. Where such an adequate opportunity exists, 
there is less of a chance that misidentification would occur than in 
the present situation where several witnesses did not have an 
adequate opportunity to view the suspect and the defendant had a 
half brother who closely resembled him. 
In all of the pre-Long cases addressing the failure to 
give an eyewitness identification instruction, the witnesses had an 
adequate opportunity to view the defendant. See State v. Bingham, 
684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1985); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Malmrose, 
649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1984); State v. Schaffer, 
638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 
1985); and State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984). This contrasts 
sharply with the present case where this Court acknowledged that 
"(n)one of the witnesses had a particularly good opportunity to 
observe the robbers." State v. Branch, supra at 5. Permitting a 
conviction to stand where an eyewitness identification instruction 
was requested by the defendant, the identification evidence was the 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"heart" of the state's case (See State v, Branch, supra at 4), the 
evidence was unreliable in that it was hesitant and conflicting, 
given by persons without adequate opportunity to view the suspects 
and presented a "substantial possibility" that the defendant was 
confused with his look alike half brother is untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
• ' • • > • - • • 
In light of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully 
petitions this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and 
give both parties the opportunity to brief the issues of whether 
Appellant's due process rights under the Utah Constitution were 
violated by the trial court's failure to give the cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction and whether Appellant's due 
process and equal protection rights were violated by this Court's 
prospective application of State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
In the alternative, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider its decision that the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to give the requested instruction and find that such a 
failure was an abuse of discretion, and reverse the convictions and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
DATED this y? day of Oc/tobyfer, 1987. 
C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 20557 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v. September 17, 1987 
Paul Anthony Branch, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler# Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leonard K. Russon 
Attorneys: Brooke Wells, Christopher Kerecman, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
DURHAM, Justice: 
/ A jury convicted defendant Paul Anthony Branch of 
theft, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The judge 
who supervised defendant's jury trial subsequently convicted 
defendant of being a habitual criminal. 
Defendant challenges the admission of testimony from 
several eyewitnesses; the judge's refusal to give a cautionary 
instruction concerning the eyewitness testimony; the sufficiency 
of the evidence; tfye judge's application of the habitual crim-
inal statute; the
 fconviction for aggravated robbery as well as 
aggravated assault and theft, which defendant claims are lesser 
included offenses of aggravated robbery; and the giving of a 
jury instruction concerning possession of recently stolen 
property. 
Two men robbed the Oakwood Jewelry store in Salt Lake 
City in August 1984. One of the robbers forced the store's sole 
employee into the bathroom at the back of the store. A customer 
interrupted the robber and was forced into the bathroom with the 
employee. The pair was instructed not to look at the robbers' 
faces. One robber guarded the bathroom while the other plun-
dered the jewelry cases. A woman and her daughter who were 
parked in a car outside the store saw the robbers leave the 
store. A diner in a nearby restaurant also observed the 
robbers leaving the store. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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/' 
In September, Los Angeles police officers arrested 
several people, including the co-defendants in this case, in 
Los Angeles on drug-related charges. A search made at the time 
of their arrest revealed jewelry from the Salt Lake robbery. 
The search also uncovered a picture of defendant's half brother 
and identification documents in the name of defendant's half 
brother. 
The Los Angeles police identified the store where some 
of the jewelry had been pawned and showed the proprietor of the 
establishment a photo array from which he selected a picture of 
defendant's half brother as the man who had pawned the stolen 
jewelry. 
The Salt Lake City police received a picture of 
defendant's half brother, which they misidentified as defendant. 
Defendant was arrested for the robbery. At the time of his 
arrest, no jewelry was found among his possessions. Defendant 
was tried with the men who were arrested in Los Angeles. 
The Eyewitness Identifications and Testimony 
Defendant raises two issues concerning the admission 
of the eyewitness testimony associating him with the crime: 
the trial court's refusal to suppress in-court identifications 
of defendant by the State's witnesses and the trial judge's 
failure to give a cautionary jury instruction concerning 
eyewitness identification. We reject defendant's arguments. 
defendant made a motion in limine to suppress the 
eyewitness testimony. In support of his motion, defendant 
presented a summary that his counsel had created from the 
police reports and uncertified copies of the preliminary 
hearing transcripts. These materials purportedly demon-
strated that the eyewitness testimony should have been 
suppressed. Defendant apparently based the motion on Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 and an assertion that improper pretrial 
identification violated defendant's federal constitutional 
rights. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). We find no 
error in the trial judge's rejection of defendant's motion. 
The trial judge stated that he found "no real evidence 
here of unnecessarily suggestive procedures that took place 
during any pretrial investigation." In the absence of clear 
ferror, we uphold a trial judge's factual assessment underlying 
a decision to grant or deny a suppression motion. State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985); State v. Tuttle, 16 
Utah 2d 288, 291, 399 P.2d 580, 582, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 872 
(1965). In this case, the trial judge considered the evidence 
proferred by the defense with appropriate suspicion. Although 
not bound by the Rules of Evidence in a suppression hearing, a 
trial judge must weigh the reliability and probative value of 
No. 20557 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
materials presented to aid in the decision to admit or exclude 
evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 1101, 104(a). In this case, the 
defense evidence consisted largely of defendant's own summaries 
of police reports and unofficial transcripts of the preliminary 
hearings prepared by the public defender's staff. Police reports 
are not prepared for the purpose of accurately recording the des-
criptions of a perpetrator given by individual witnesses; rather, 
they are compiled to aid the police in apprehending the perpe-
trator and often reflect the product of collective memory as it 
is gathered by several officers who communicate with each other. 
Defendant's prepared abstracts of such records are even more sus-
pect because the witnesses' statements had been filtered through 
yet another recorder, who is not likely to be unbiased. The 
preliminary hearing reports are similarly suspect because the 
" preparation was done, not by a neutral reporter, but by a party. 
Further, the trial judge felt that various witnesses' statements 
which described defendant as Mexican, Iranian, or Italian were 
not necessarily inconsistent and were not the product of improper 
police procedure, leaving the issue of inconsistency for cross-
examination at trial. The only evidence defendant presented 
concerning the pretrial identification procedures used by the 
police was statements of defendant's counsel concerning the array 
displays and the pictures used in the arrays.1 Therefore, we 
think the judge did not err in rejecting defendant's claim that 
the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive. 
The trial judge was also correct in refusing to exclude 
the testimony on the basis of Utah Rule of Evidence 403: 
' Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
"We will not overturn the trial court's ruling [on the 
application of Rule 403] unless the abuse of discretion is so 
severe that it results in a 'likelihood of injustice.'" State 
v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311. 312 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982)). We do not think the 
trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to exclude the 
eyewitness identifications. Indeed, we do not see how the eye-
witness testimony could fall within the categories of evidence 
excludable under Rule 403. The eyewitness testimony did not 
have the inflammatory potential found in the sort of evidence 
typically excluded under that Rule. See State v. Cloud, 722 
Tl The police officer who showed at least one witness a photo 
array was cross-examined by the counsel of one of the co-
defendants concerning the identification of that co-defendant. 
3 No. 20557 
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P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) (gruesome photographs of a crime victim 
should have been excluded because the probative value of the 
photographs was outweighed by the possibility that the jury's 
passions would be inflamed by the gruesome nature of the crime 
and would distract them from the issue of the defendant's mental 
state). Nor could the eyewitness testimony have confused or 
misled the jury or wasted its time. The eyewitness testimony 
was the heart of the State's case and did not serve to draw the 
jury into the type of collateral assessments that Rule 403 is 
designed to avoid. The trial judge was correct in allowing the 
jury to assess the credibility of the eyewitness; Rule 403 is 
not to be used to allow the trial judge to substitute his 
assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the 
jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not 
find it credible. 
We next consider defendant's claim that a cautionary 
instruction should have been given. In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986), we made a detailed analytical consideration of 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony and concluded that "in 
cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall give such 
an instruction whenever eyewitness identification-is a central 
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the 
defense." Id. at 492. This case was, however, tried before 
Long became law. In reviewing cases tried before Long, we 
evaluate the defendant's claim under the case law applicable 
at the time the defendant was tried. State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 
1378-, 1380 (Utah 1986) . 
At the time of trial, the giving of a cautionary 
instructicJn was left to the discretion of the trial judge under 
the "totality of the circumstances." State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 
1251, 1254 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 
(Utah 1986) (summarizing the crucial pre-Long case law). 
This case presents us with a particularly difficult 
task in evaluating whether the trial judge abused his discre-
tion. The eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as one of 
the robbers was equivocal. The jewelry store clerk admitted 
that she did not see defendant during the robbery because she 
was restrained in the bathroom by a man she identified as one 
of the co-defendants. A Los Angeles police officer identified 
defendant as a man he saw walking in front of the motel where 
the co-defendants were arrested. The officer admitted that 
he was on a routine patrol when he saw defendant for a few 
moments. The officer testified that he had observed defendant 
only briefly and had no reason to suspect defendant of any 
criminal activity. The officer admitted that defendant strongly 
resembled defendant's half brother, whose picture was found in 
the co-defendants' motel room, and that the officer had only 
recently learned that the picture was not of defendant. The 
officer admitted that the photo had been included in photo 
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spreads on the assumption that it was of defendant. The 
officer's partner, who had a similarly brief glimpse, also 
identified defendant* Defendant was identified by the owner of 
the jewelry store, who claimed he saw defendant walking around 
in the store early on the day of the robbery. However, the 
store owner identified one of defendant's co-defendants as 
defendant at trial and then changed his mind and identified 
defendant. The mother and the daughter who were in a parked 
car in front of the jewelry store and saw the robbers briefly 
as they left the store identified defendant, whom they described 
as bearded. The diner in the restaurant across the street also 
identified defendant. Finally, the customer who interrupted 
the robbery testified. She described the man she saw in the 
front of the store as unbearded. On direct examination, she 
identified one of the co-defendants as the robber at the front 
of the store. Under cross-examination, she changed her mind 
and identified defendant. 
None of the witnesses had a particularly good 
opportunity to observe the robbers. The witnesses gave incon-
sistent and hesitant descriptions, and some witnesses changed 
their opinion at trial. Furthermore, there exists a substantial 
possibility that defendant has been confused in this case with 
his half brother, who closely resembles him. On the other hand, 
we have never found an abuse of discretion when a judge refused 
a cautionary instruction in a case with more than one eye-
witness, and having decided to apply Long prospectively, we must 
be cautious in applying the pre-Long case law without reference 
to our later analysis. Were I writing only for myself and 
Justice Stewart, I would find an abuse of discretion. However, 
three of .my colleagues are convinced that no abuse of discretion 
occurred; therefore, defendant's argument must be rejected. 
We also reject defendant's claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction. The jury simply chose 
to believe the eyewitness identifications of defendant. 
f 
The Lesser Included Offense 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery of the 
store clerk and aggravated assault of the customer who inter-
rupted the robbery and was forced into the bathroom. The jury 
also found defendant guilty of theft. Defendant argues that 
aggravated assault and theft are lesser included offenses of 
aggravated robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978). 
toe analyze the issues separately. 
We disagree with defendant as to the aggravated assault 
charge. A charge is a lesser included offense when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
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(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or 
an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978). 
In this case, aggravated robbery and aggravated 
assault were simply two offenses committed within the same 
criminal episode. The crimes required proof by different 
evidence and had two different victims. The testimony of the 
store clerk established the robbery; the testimony of the 
customer proved the assault. 
We agree with defendant, however, that theft is a 
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery in this case. In 
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), we considered whether 
theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. The 
analysis set forth in that case is controlling. 
The principal test [for whether a crime 
is a lesser included offense] involves a com-
parison of the statutory elements of each 
crime. Subsection 76-1-402(3)(a) provides 
I the definition of lesser included offenses 
that is applied for this purpose: an offense 
-ijS lesser included when *[i]t is established 
by proof of the same or less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged . . . ." Thus, where 
the two crimes are "such that the greater 
cannot be committed without necessarily 
having committed the lesser," State v. 
Baker, Utah, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (1983), then 
as a matter of law they stand in the relation-
ship of greater and lesser offenses, and the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for 
both. So it is with robbery and theft, which 
are generally acknowledged to occupy the 
greater-lesser relationship. State v. 
Elliott, Utah, 641 P.2d 122, 123 (1982); 
People v. Cole, 31 Cal. 3d 568, 582, 645 P.2d 
1182, 1191, 183 Cal. Rptr. 350, 359 (1982). 
The secondary test is required by the 
circumstance that some crimes have multiple 
variations, so that a greater-lesser 
relationship exists between some variations 
of these crimes, but not between others. 
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E.g., State in Interest of L.G.W., Utah, 641 
P.2d 127, 130-31 (1982) (forcible sexual 
abuse and lewdness). A theoretical com-
parison of the statutory elements of two 
crimes having multiple variations will be 
insufficient. In order to determine whether 
a defendant can be convicted and punished 
for two different crimes committed in con-
nection with a single criminal episode, the 
court must consider the evidence to deter-
mine whether the greater-lesser relationship 
exists between the specific variations of 
the crimes actually proved at trial. The 
multiple variations of the crime of aggra-
vated robbery involved in this case show why 
this is necessary. 
Aggravated robbery is committed by 
using a firearm in one of three circum-
stances: "[1] in an attempt to commit, [2] 
during the commission of, or [3] in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or com-
mission of a robbery." § 76-6-302(1) and 
(3). As the district court concluded, 
according to a theoretical comparison of the 
statutory elements of each crime, theft is 
not a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery because theft is not "established by 
proof of the same or less than all the facts 
-required to establish the commission of 
[*one variation of] the offense charged." 
§ 76-1-402(3)(a). This is because the 
obtaining or exercising of unauthorized 
control over the property of another (an 
element of theft) is not an element of the 
first variation of aggravated robbery (use 
of a gun'in an attempt to commit a robbery). 
In contrast, the greater-lesser relationship 
does exist between theft and the second 
variation of aggravated robbery (use cff a 
gun during the commission of a robbery). 
In this case, the only evidence before 
the jury showed a completed robbery, with 
property taken from the person of the manager 
by use of a firearm, and the crime of theft 
as part of that same criminal episode. As to 
- this variation of aggravated robbery, the 
crime of theft is a lesser included offense. 
Consequently, on the facts of this case 
§ 76-1-402(3) clearly bars this defendant's 
being convicted and punished for theft in 
addition to aggravated robbery. 
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State v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97-98 (footnote omitted). 
The State attempts to distinguish Hill by arguing that 
defendant was charged with second degree felony theft, which 
requires that the property stolen is valued at over $1,000. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) (1978). We cannot 
accept that argument. Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) does not 
outline the elements of the crime of theft; it simply cate-
gorizes theft for sentencing purposes into various degrees 
of felonies and misdemeanors. 
The State also argues that defendant committed 
attempted theft and thus is within the version of aggravated 
robbery of which theft is not a lesser included offense. State 
v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. We cannot see how that follows from 
the facts, which demonstrate a "completed robbery" as in Hill. 
Jury Instruction 
Defendant asserts numerous errors surrounding a jury 
instruction concerning possession of recently stolen property. 
The facts, however, contain no suggestion that defendant ever 
had possession of recently stolen property; thus, the instruc-
tion could not, even if it was erroneous, have prejudiced him. 
The issue of the propriety of the instruction is one for defen-
dant #s co-defendants who were in possession of the stolen 
jewelry when they were arrested. 
/ 
Habitual Criminal 
Defendant was convicted under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1001 (1978) of being a habitual criminal. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978) (a defendant with two prior convictions 
within certain statutorily set perimeters may "upon conviction 
of at least a felony of the second degree . . ."be determined 
to be a habitual priminal). 
The State offered proof of three previous eligible 
felony convictions. One conviction was accompanied by an 
affidavit of voluntariness signed by defendant. The affidavit 
was apparently executed pursuant to Utah District Court Rule of 
Practice 3.6, which gives a trial judge the option of having a 
defendant sign an affidavit of voluntariness. Defendant does 
not assail the State's use of that affidavit. See State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1985) (affidavit signed by 
plaintiff, with advice of counsel, raises presumptions of vol-
untariness and knowledge of elements and nature of charge). 
Defendant argues not that his other two guilty pleas were 
involuntary, but that the State has not proven that the other 
two pleas were voluntary. We agree that an involuntary guilty 
plea cannot be used to enhance or support a subsequent con-
viction. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (plea 
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entered without counsel could not support a conviction under 
recidivist statute). However, we agree with the trial court 
that the State has proven that defendant's prior guilty pleas 
were voluntary. The State demonstrated that both pleas were 
entered with the benefit of counsel. Therefore, in the absence 
of any evidence demonstrating the pleas were involuntary, the 
pleas are presumed to have been voluntary. See Moxley v. 
Morris, 655 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1982). A defendant can overcome 
this presumption by presenting to the trial court some evidence 
of involuntariness, thus shifting back to the State the burden 
of demonstrating voluntariness. The defendant is the party who 
can most readily demonstrate that the pleas were involuntarily 
made if they indeed were; it therefore seems unreasonable to 
impose upon the State the duty of showing not only that the 
pleas were made with adequate counsel, but also that the pleas 
were not involuntary. 
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect 
of the errors he alleges denied him a fair trial and that 
reversal is required because of the cumulative effect even if 
no single error was prejudicial. We need not consider this 
argument because the only legitimate error raised- by defendant 
was his conviction of both a greater and lesser included 
offense. We reverse defendant's conviction for theft and 
vacate the sentence thereon and affirm defendant's conviction 
for aggravated robbery. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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